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Introduction 
 
 
The European Union’s 
Digital Assertiveness 
Annegret Bendiek, Christoph Berlich and Tobias Metzger 
The European institutions and EU member states are pushing hard for closer digital 
integration. In view of the diverse challenges – from protecting critical infrastructure 
and safeguarding civil liberties to the creation of common markets – “positive integra-
tion”, that is targeted EU regulatory action, is the way to tackle market failure within 
and beyond Europe. Draft regulations at the EU level are to take effect inside and out-
side the internal market: the Digital Single Market Strategy (DSM), the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Directive on Network and Information Security 
(NIS). Digital integration is a precondition for establishing European standards and 
norms effectively, especially in international politics. 
 
Digital information systems, above all 
the Internet, play a central role in the free 
movement of goods, services and people 
across borders. Legislation at all levels 
struggles to keep pace with rapid techno-
logical advances, leaving many areas 
inadequately regulated. Yet legal security 
in dealing with technology and lasting pub-
lic confidence in its reliability are crucial 
to economic development. For its current 
five-year term, the European Commission 
estimates that creating an interconnected 
digital single market could create addition-
al growth of up to €250 billion. 
Following the concept of negative and 
positive integration (Fritz W. Scharpf) there 
are two main options for state (de-)regu-
lation in response to an expansion of eco-
nomic space beyond national borders. 
Negative integration removes obstacles to 
competition and free trade (such as tariffs). 
This has a market-creating effect. Positive 
integration measures aim to correct market 
outcomes and overcome market failure. 
This requires economic policy coordination 
and regulatory powers at the EU level. 
Therefore, digital integration – analogously 
to previous non-digital economic integra-
tion – should be understood as the expan-
sion of a unified societal space, which is 
subject to shared rules and which is char-
acterised by the removal of institutional 
barriers between EU member states. Funda-
mentally, market regulation happens at 
multiple levels: global standards must be set 
in international forums, data protection 
should be harmonised at the EU level, while 
prosecution of cybercrime is mostly done at 
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the national level (if necessary coordinated 
EU-wide). Digital regulation should, there-
fore, be understood as a multi-layered struc-
ture. The existence of the single market 
makes the Union not only an important 
locus of regulation, but also a strong eco-
nomic actor with the global ambition of 
digital assertiveness. In the past, establish-
ing standards such as MP3, SMS and Com-
pact Disk in Europe has proven effective in 
compelling non-European market partici-
pants to join. As the experience of Airbus 
has, and the satellite navigation system 
Galileo might, demonstrate, the EU frame-
work can enable state and non-state actors 
to influence global standard-setting to 
an extent denied to individual states and 
private corporations. 
Challenges of the 
Digital Single Market 
The challenges associated with creating 
a digital single market can be illustrated 
by the virtual path of an e-mail. Which 
1) hardware and software is used to write 
an e-mail, via which 2) Internet routing 
infrastructures is it transmitted, on whose 
3) data servers and cloud services is it saved, 
with which 4) techniques is it encrypted 
there, and by which 5) data protection and 
competition regulations is it protected? 
These steps along the digital path demon-
strate the need for regulation and reveal 
why the European Union is the appropriate 
level at which this should occur: 
Firstly, Europe, apart from a handful of 
exceptions such as SAP and Alcatel-Lucent, 
has ceased to be a relevant actor in the soft-
ware and hardware sectors. The European 
industry’s dependency on US and Chinese 
components makes a completely independ-
ent European market inconceivable. Many 
industries, such as that of search engine 
providers, are currently dominated by 
quasi-monopolists: Microsoft, Google, Cisco 
and Huawei. The leading PC manufacturers 
include Apple, Dell, HP (all USA), MSI, ASUS, 
Acer (all Taiwan), Samsung (South Korea), 
Lenovo (China) and Toshiba (Japan). Some 
of these are also among the world’s leading 
smartphone manufacturers, alongside Hua-
wei (China) and LG (South Korea). Hardware 
components for home networks originate 
largely from Cisco (USA) or Huawei (China), 
while HP leads Dell and IBM in server hard-
ware for data centres. The market share of 
European competitors (Siemens, Nokia) has 
shrunk significantly, leaving a de facto US-
Asian duopoly. 
Secondly, Europe needs a reliable com-
munication network operated and admin-
istered in the public interest. Individual 
interests should only be provided space 
where they align with the general interest. 
Precisely the opposite is the case in Europe 
today. The Internet consists of national 
networks, each with its own set of control-
lers, respectively pursuing particular inter-
ests. In theory, the Internet comprises the 
networks of various Internet service pro-
viders (ISPs), which are joined at neutral 
points (Internet exchange points) to create 
the network of networks. In practice, the 
notion of neutrality is questionable. DE-CIX 
is the largest of the worldwide 321 Internet 
exchange points and belongs to the Asso-
ciation of the German Internet Industry 
(eco). DE-CIX is run in a manner that grants 
access to the German intelligence service 
BND, thus compromising the data of pri-
marily non-German entities. One may doubt 
whether this procedure safeguards Euro-
pean interests. 
Thirdly, diverse new challenges arise with 
respect to cloud computing and distributed 
data processing and storage. The problem 
for positive regulation of European data 
and consumer protection is that the legal 
and economic spaces are not necessarily 
identical. Where data and access requests 
are outside the reach of European law en-
forcement, European legislation is tooth-
less. The danger of major data theft from 
cloud platforms lurks above all when serv-
ers are located outside of Europe. Further-
more, terms of business that grant access 
rights to third parties can have unforeseen 
consequences. Not only do US providers 
have to hand over data stored on European 
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servers when requested (see the case of 
Microsoft Ireland versus the US Department 
of Justice) but European firms operating 
in the United States are also subject to the 
same obligation. 
Fourthly, the digitalisation of communi-
cation has hollowed out the right to privacy. 
As the Snowden revelations demonstrate, 
state security agencies can access and ana-
lyse unencrypted e-mails whenever they 
wish. Yet privacy and liberty are funda-
mental conditions for the market itself 
and therefore require protection. In liberal 
societies the right to privacy is also con-
stitutive, for without privacy there can 
be no liberty. The endangerment of data 
privacy and consequently social liberty calls 
for a European response. Because telecom-
munications and information infrastruc-
ture is in private ownership and networks 
transcend national borders, the emphasis is 
currently on improving encryption methods. 
However, encryption technologies must 
come without any hidden access options 
(back doors) demanded for investigation 
purposes not only by the Chinese govern-
ment but also by its US and British counter-
parts. A great deal of information can also 
be gleaned from encrypted e-mails. The 
metadata – so to speak the envelope con-
taining the message – reveals who is in 
contact with whom, when and how often, 
and even the subject line of the message. 
Fifthly, quasi-monopolies of major 
corporations are fundamentally problemat-
ic. Cartels and other forms of market 
domination lead to higher prices, inferior 
products and grave deviations from the 
ideal of the free market. Although merger 
controls do exist, European competition law 
oftentimes does not respond with sanctions 
until market domination has actually led 
to abuses. Nonetheless, there is currently 
extensive discussion on whether US tech-
nology giant Google occupies a market-
dominating position in Europe. In Novem-
ber 2010, then EU Competition Commis-
sioner Joaquín Almunia opened a case 
against Google, which his successor Mar-
grethe Vestager has now revived after 
collating extensive evidence that Google’s 
search results systematically favour its own 
services over those of its rivals. The Com-
petition Commissioner is also taking action 
against several states that may have granted 
corporations such as Amazon and Apple 
advantages through tax rulings. If individ-
ual companies hereby benefit at the cost of 
their rivals, this constitutes a violation of 
competition law. 
Deepening Digital Integration 
Historically, regulatory challenges of the 
kind illustrated using the virtual path of an 
email have often contributed to ambitious 
leaps in European integration. The most 
striking example is the creation of the in-
ternal market through the Single European 
Act in 1987. In order to deepen digital inte-
gration, Andrus Ansip, Vice President of the 
European Commission for the Digital Single 
Market, and Günther Oettinger, Commis-
sioner for the Digital Economy and Society 
since November 2014, are therefore push-
ing hard for the establishment of a digital 
single market. The objective is to expand 
the advantages of the European internal 
market to the digital sphere. According to 
the Commission, we will only benefit from 
the technical innovations associated with 
big data, cloud computing and the Internet 
of Things, if attempts at digital sovereignty 
are overcome in favour of a European har-
monisation of national markets. The April 
2014 ruling of the European Court of Jus-
tice, overturning the Data Retention Direc-
tive and demanding greater data protection 
and security on the basis of European law, 
can be considered an instigator for initia-
tives to realise the digital single market. 
The ruling sets legal limits on the storage 
of information of EU citizens in third coun-
tries and provides economic incentives for 
establishing a European network infra-
structure. 
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The Strategy for a 
Digital Single Market 
The Digital Single Market Strategy pub-
lished by the European Commission at the 
beginning of June 2015 comprises sixteen 
measures to be implemented by the end of 
2016. It is based on three pillars: 1) better 
access to digital goods and services for con-
sumers and businesses across Europe; 2) the 
creation of infrastructure for digital net-
works and services and 3) the exploitation 
of growth potentials of the digital economy. 
By virtue of market-creating measures 
defined in the first pillar, companies in the 
digital single market should experience no 
(or only minimal) obstacles compared to 
national commerce (negative integration). 
To this end, contract law and VAT rules are 
to be harmonised and cross-border data 
delivery services improved. The strategy 
also has the goal of ending access restric-
tions (geo-blocking), for example by stand-
ardising copyright law. The Commission 
wishes to reduce barriers to e-commerce, 
harmonise tax rules, investigate the market 
power of online platforms such as search 
engines and social networks, and reform 
the legal framework for audio-visual media. 
As part of the second pillar, the Commis-
sion proposes new rules (positive integra-
tion). The planned NIS Directive will make 
operators of critical infrastructure liable for 
failures. Apart from having to ensure better 
IT security, providers of services such as 
trading platforms, payment systems, social 
networks, search engines and data clouds 
will be obliged to report serious cyber-
attacks and will have to implement appro-
priate safeguards in line with the planned 
EU rules. The rights of the end user, as 
the weakest link in the chain, will also be 
strengthened by compelling providers to 
report security violations and loss of integ-
rity (data falsification). Technical norms are 
to be harmonised and trustworthy cloud 
services certified. The Commission will also 
review the indemnifications for providers 
affected by the Electronic Commerce Direc-
tive and harmonise procedures for remov-
ing illegal content from the Internet (terror-
ist propaganda, child pornography, copy-
right violations). An extensive reform of 
copyright law is currently under discussion 
in the European Parliament. 
The third pillar is about both expanding 
the European digital economy and support-
ing the increasing use of digital technology 
in conventional industry. Medium-sized 
businesses and start-ups are to be supported 
through easier access to investment capital, 
and the legal regulation of portability, inter-
operability and standardisation is to be im-
proved with regard to cloud computing and 
big data solutions. The main thrust of the EU 
regulation is to prevent confidential data 
getting into the wrong hands on account 
of inadequate security or a defective legal 
framework. Restrictive laws on data loca-
tion and encryption methods are to be 
harmonised so that all European market 
participants are treated equally in all 
respects. It is important to remember that 
data routing between places outside the 
United States, for example communication 
between Estonia and Italy, may still pass 
through US servers. The feared consequences 
for data protection lend weight to calls for 
restricting routing to the Schengen area. 
However, this is problematic for economic 
reasons and since it risks decreasing tech-
nical reliability. The US Trade Representa-
tive (USTR) regards it as a violation of inter-
national trade agreements – even though 
similar arrangements also exist in the 
United States. 
A more convincing proposal comes from 
the European Network and Information 
Security Agency (ENISA). It contains possi-
bilities for end-to-end encryption for various 
applications (securing data when sending 
and receiving as well as in transit). Methods 
for disguising metadata are also considered, 
for example using virtual private networks 
or onion routing to encrypt an e-mail multi-
ple times. The encryption layers are then 
placed like envelopes around the actual mes-
sage, with each party involved permitted 
access only to the information it requires 
to forward the message. 
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Data Protection as 
Competitive Advantage 
To counteract illegal exploitation of con-
tent and data on the Internet, copyright, 
data protection and consumer rights are 
also to be refined at the national and Euro-
pean levels. The aim of the planned 
European General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR) is to enforce data protection 
in order to improve legal certainty for 
businesses in the internal market. In June 
2015, after more than three years of nego-
tiations, the EU interior and justice minis-
ters agreed on a joint position towards 
reform of data protection rules. The pro-
posal is now under discussion in the 
Trilogue between European Council, Com-
mission and European Parliament. The 
new GDPR is intended to come into force 
in 2018 to replace the Data Protection 
Directive of 1995. It proposes to compel 
businesses to implement strong default 
privacy settings in their technologies, 
enable class action suits over privacy 
violations, improve cooperation between 
national regulators, and create a harmo-
nised oversight mechanism. Not least, 
sanctions in response to data protection 
violations are proposed. While the original 
draft of the European Commission sets 
these at two percent of the company’s 
global turnover, the European Parlia-
ment calls for the fine to be set at five 
percent of annual turnover and at least 
€100 million. 
The “right to be forgotten”, which the 
Spaniard Mario Costeja González won from 
Google in the European Court of Justice 
ruling of 13 May 2014 and which has trans-
formed Europe’s digital economy, is a cen-
tral point in the GDPR. The ruling states 
that search engines must observe valid data 
protection directives and cannot fall back 
on American law even if the parent com-
pany is headquartered in the United States 
and its data are processed there. Every EU 
citizen now has the right to demand for 
the search engines to delete their personal 
information. Google alone, according to its 
own figures, had received 293,004 deletion 
requests by 6 August 2015, 41.3 percent of 
which had been fulfilled. 
Under Article 23 (1) of the GDPR, data 
protection must in the future be integrated 
directly into processes, systems and prod-
ucts. Sensitive data from EU citizens may 
only be passed to foreign security agencies 
under the terms of a judicial assistance 
agreement. Under current law, it is for-
bidden to transfer personal data from mem-
ber states to countries that do not possess 
data protection comparable to European 
law. This is an important issue, because 
the European constitutional understanding 
diverges significantly from the American 
one. In the United States the focus is not 
on the protection of human dignity, but on 
freedom in the sense of liberty as a civil right 
of the individual, who wishes to be “free of 
legal regulations”. But the new GDPR and 
the proposed directive on personal data 
protection in law enforcement are aimed 
at implementing legal guarantees for EU 
citizens in the judicial assistance system. 
The data protection reform package will 
therefore have repercussions on all new 
bilateral agreements with the United States 
on data transfer in the areas of security and 
economy. This includes among others the 
exchange of personal data, the data protec-
tion umbrella agreement, the bilateral 
mutual legal assistance agreement, and the 
exchange of airline passenger data. 
Europe in the Digital World 
The European regulatory system is not 
restricted to the internal market, but also 
has a global dimension. The European 
information and communications sector is 
closely interconnected with other markets. 
In order to take account of the reciprocal 
dependencies of European and global stand-
ards and rules, the European Commission 
and individual member states have become 
active in international bodies on the central 
issues of Internet Governance and cyber-
security. For this reason, digital integration 
also comprises a foreign policy dimension 
affecting not only the expansion of the 
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digital internal market beyond national 
borders but also the member states’ cyber 
foreign and security policy. Accordingly, 
the European Council conclusions on Inter-
net Governance of November 2014 and on 
cyberdiplomacy of February 2015 call for 
a “multi-stakeholder approach”, including 
representatives of business, the technical 
community, science and civil society as well 
as governments. Furthermore, they demand 
close cyberdiplomacy with the United States, 
for example in the Group of Governmental 
Experts (GGE) at the UN level. 
In the relevant documents on European 
cybersecurity of February 2013 and on 
Internet Governance of February 2014, the 
European Union argues that freedom, secu-
rity and stability are vital for the safeguard-
ing of cyberspace. Internet Governance 
refers to the development and application 
of shared principles, norms and approaches 
in global communication. Since June 2011, 
the European Commission has been pur-
suing the objective of creating “a single, 
open, free, unfragmented network of net-
works, subject to the same laws and norms 
that apply in other areas of our day-to-day 
lives” (in EU terminology: COMPACT). In 
order to prevent state influence from erod-
ing the multi-stakeholder approach, the 
European Union intends to strengthen the 
role of the Internet Governance Forum 
(IGF), the global multi-stakeholder forum 
with 3,700 members from 144 countries 
(2014). The UN General Assembly will 
decide at the end of 2015 whether to con-
tinue the format. At the same time, the 
European Union is calling on the organisa-
tions managing the Internet to “interna-
tionalise”. This primarily concerns ICANN 
(Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers), which is responsible for the 
stable functioning of the Internet, and its 
IANA department (Internet Assigned Num-
bers Authority), which assigns numbers 
and names on the Internet, above all IP 
addresses. The European Union wishes to 
prevent individual states or private inter-
ests from dominating the administration 
of Internet resources. Therein, the EU is 
(at least officially) at loggerheads with the 
United States, which plays a leading role in 
ICANN. The process of preparing improved 
accountability procedures, for example to 
challenge decisions of the ICANN Board, 
is ongoing. ICANN CEO Fadi Chehadé has 
already stated that it will not be possible to 
complete the hand-over of oversight of core 
Internet administrative functions by Sep-
tember 2015 as planned. Therefore, he said, 
ICANN will be extending its contracts with 
the US Department of Commerce. 
Another arena of multi-stakeholder dis-
cussion was the NETmundial conference in 
2014, where the focus was on human rights 
and the right to privacy on the Internet. 
As a result, a European, the Maltese Joseph 
Cannataci, was appointed as the first UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy 
by the UN’s Human Rights Council in July 
2015. 
Moreover, at the initiative of the World 
Economic Forum (WEF), the Brazilian Inter-
net Steering Committee (CGI) and ICANN, 
the so-called NETmundial Initiative (NMI) 
was launched in January 2015. However, 
with European participants criticising its 
composition and lack of distance to the IGF, 
it has yet to establish a place for itself in the 
Internet governance ecosystem. 
In an open letter of April 2015, Federica 
Mogherini, High Representative of the Euro-
pean Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, and Dutch Foreign Minister Bert 
Koenders lay out the European Union’s 
lowest common denominators. They point 
out the necessity to hold states responsible 
for attacks originating from their own 
national cyberspace and emphasise that 
inadequate protection of central infra-
structure represents a threat not only to 
national but also international security. 
This lowest common denominator was 
promoted by five EU member states in the 
fourth round of the UN Group of Govern-
mental Experts (GGE) on cybersecurity (al-
together representing twenty governments: 
Antigua and Barbuda, Belarus, Brazil [chair], 
China, Colombia, Egypt, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Ghana, Israel, Japan, Kenya, 
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Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Spain, 
United Kingdom, USA). Diplomats in the 
GGE analyse security risks in cyberspace 
and develop confidence building measures 
(CBM) as well as starting points for coopera-
tion. The last session of the fourth round 
was held in New York in late June 2015; its 
final report has yet to be adopted by the UN 
General Assembly. The concrete application 
of international law to cyberspace contin-
ues to be a source of conflict. Incompatible 
interpretations of information security 
make a substantive discussion at the UN 
level almost impossible. Contested issues 
include the scope of issues to be discussed, 
differing threat perceptions, and the en-
visioned role of the UN and governments 
vis-à-vis private-sector and civil society 
actors. While there is broad agreement that 
states must be held responsible for their 
behaviour in cyberspace, Germany and the 
United States regard current international 
(humanitarian) law as the sufficient legal 
starting point for cyberspace, while Russia, 
China and other states demand the develop-
ment of specific international law for cyber-
space. The G-77 states are above all interested 
in discussing the topic of cybersecurity in 
an open working group or carrying it into 
the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. 
The European Union does not operate as a 
monolithic bloc at the UN level, but co-
ordination exists between Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom. This coordination 
also includes other like-minded Western 
countries in the group. With Russia already 
calling for a fifth round of GGE discussions, 
we have reason to believe that the EU mem-
ber states represented there will have to 
keep a stronger eye than ever on European 
interests. 
Requirements for German Politics 
Many regard the EU’s overall digital strat-
egy as without ambitions and incapable of 
advancing Europe’s digital assertiveness 
vis-à-vis the United States and China. Even 
large member states like Germany can 
exert global influence only in cooperation 
with EU institutions and other member 
states. The Friends of the Presidency Group 
on Cyber Issues (FoP Cyber) coordinates 
within Europe to support the respective EU 
Council Presidency, and should also expand 
its remit to international organisations. The 
EU’s digital assertiveness requires addition-
al international flanking measures in order 
to stabilise the values of freedom and 
democracy in Europe and generate greater 
global traction. As part of the 2014 Digital 
Agenda, the German government has stated 
its intent to take “measures to regain tech-
nological sovereignty” and to create “a Euro-
pean area of trust”. In the logic of negative 
and positive integration (Scharpf), techno-
logical sovereignty in the internal market 
would be legitimate only where it does not 
undermine significant achievements of 
social market economy and democracy. The 
internal market is based on fundamental 
trust in the forces of the free market and 
principles of openness and non-discrimi-
nation. Scepticism is therefore warranted 
towards the establishment of heavily sub-
sidised national or European companies. 
State intervention is only appropriate where 
the market fails in providing important 
goods such as data security and privacy. 
Reciprocal global dependencies are not per 
se problematic, but become unacceptable 
when they undermine Europeans’ ability 
to autonomously control their data and sys-
tems vis-à-vis illiberal governments. States 
that reject values such as the free market, 
democracy and human freedom should be 
regarded as second-choice sources of stra-
tegically important resources for European 
communication infrastructure. Purchasing 
rare earths from Australia, for example, is 
more expensive, but avoids political double 
standards. 
The case of Estonia offers an example of 
a successful digitalisation strategy. With 
only about 1.3 million inhabitants, the coun-
try is a pioneer of digitalisation in Europe. 
Its national e-ID infrastructure is used by 
more than 90 percent of its citizens. The 
digital ID card has a range of functions and 
can be used on the Internet wherever iden-
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tity verification is required, for example 
for bank transactions or voting. Estonia 
operates largely without using Russian 
infrastructure and technology and has 
established a strong security network with 
eight international mirror servers in friend-
ly states, including the United Kingdom, 
Germany, the United States, Canada, South 
Africa and Japan. As far as electronic gov-
ernance is concerned, small countries like 
Estonia are considerably further advanced 
than the big EU member states. 
The further the European Union advances 
its digital integration in the form of Euro-
pean law, the more it will strengthen its 
digital assertiveness, both within Europe 
and internationally. The market location 
principle, a central instrument of the in-
ternal market, guarantees equal treatment 
of domestic and foreign businesses. Digital 
assertiveness depends crucially on the wil-
lingness of member states to expand the 
quantity and quality of European law. Only 
the European Union has the potential to 
forge a third way outside of the technologi-
cal dominance of the United States and 
China, not individual member states. 
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